Policing and Politics Pushed for Counter-Terrorism

Multiple terrorist bombings rocked India, Turkey and Iraq last week. Above is a photograph of the aftermath of a July 27 bombing in Ahmadabad, India. (AP Photo/Ajit Solanki)

A preview of the new National Defense Strategy leaked last week (purposefully?) identifies terrorism as the principal threat to the United States:

For the foreseeable future, (the strategic) environment will be defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state system. Beyond this transnational struggle, we face other threats, including a variety of irregular challenges, the quest by rogue states for nuclear weapons, and the rising military power of other states. These are long-term challenges. Success in dealing with them will require the orchestration of national and international power over years or decades to come.

The NDS preview concludes, "... winning the Long War against violent extremist movements will be the central objective of the U.S. We must defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society and foster an environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all those who support them."

In another report released last week a RAND study, conducted in cooperation with the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, focuses on "how terrorist groups end" - whether in defeat or withering away. The study examined the experience of 648 terrorist organizations operating over the last half-century. According to the report, "... most groups ended because of operations carried out by local police or intelligence agencies or because they negotiated a settlement with their governments. Military force was rarely the primary reason a terrorist group ended, and few groups within this time frame achieved victory. These findings suggest that the U.S. approach to countering al Qa'ida has focused far too much on the use of military force. Instead, policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. efforts."

Does RAND fundamentally disagree with the National Defense Strategy? Not really.

The DOD strategy emphasizes, "The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies. For these reasons, arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves."

Both reports suggest politicking and policing are usually the most effective measures against terrorism. Military operations can be - even with the most sophisticated planning - a blunt instrument more effective for short-term containment than long-term resolution.

This has arguably been the case with most historical examples, whether the "terrorist" is a 19th Century Anarchist or an 11th Century Assassin of Alamut or a 20th Century freedom fighter. Military power can set some conditions, but resolution has almost always depended on transforming the potential terrorist's sense of purpose to lessen the value of violence.